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There are currently three difficult issues about which the Church's 
magisterium has not spoken. All three have to do with the beginning 
phases of human life. Two of the issues have directly to do with the status 
of human embryos and two of them have to do with the use of stem cells 
and stem cell lines derived from a human person at the beginning of the 
human person's life: in one case, from a human embryo, and in another 
case, from a human fetus. All three issues are difficult for three reasons. 
First, there is a "gray" or seemingly ambiguous set of circumstances that 
surround them. Secondly, with all three issues, it is possible to think of 
legitimate and even noble intentions for pursuing the practices involved in 
them. Thirdly, on all three issues, proponents of the practices involved 
appear to resort to apparently sound moral reasoning, especially in terms of 
the principle of cooperation. However, the fundamental problem afflicting 
the proponents of the practices connected with these issues is a 
dangerously narrow moral vision. More specifically, in the face of the 
long-term implications of modem technology, especially as it relates to 
human life, these proponents fail to weigh the long-term consequences of 
their proposed practices. 
1. The first issue is about those human embryos that have been 
brought into the laboratory, usually for purposes of in vitro 
fertilization, but left unused. 
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The question arises: what should be done with them? Of course, 
they never should have been brought into the laboratory in the flrst place. 
Human embryos belong nowhere except in their own mother's wombs. 
Nevertheless, these human embryos are indeed in the laboratory and a 
moral decision has to be made about them. 
Some have proposed that, in order to save them from being 
destroyed or subjected to further manipulation, these embryos should be 
adopted by women in whom they could be implanted for the purposes of 
gestation and birth. The magisterium has not spoken specifically to this 
matter, but has spoken to related matters that are grounded on a basic 
principle. The principle is that it is wrong - indeed, intrinsically evil -
to implant human embryos in a genetically foreign womb (Charter for 
Health Care Workers, n. 29). The magisterium taught this in connection 
with "surrogate motherhood" but it logically follows that it applies to this 
specific proposal as well. This logical connection is easily lost within the 
context and/or under the influence of the culture of death, which numbs us 
to the evil of allowing human embryos to be anywhere other than in their 
mother's wombs. Numbness to this evil alone explains how "adopting" 
human embryos and implanting them in genetically foreign wombs could 
be viewed either as a morally good action or even as a morally neutral 
action that could be made morally distinct from a "surrogate motherhood" 
by a good intention. 
If "surrogate motherhood" is intrinsically evil, then, of course, one 
may not morally justifiably resort to this act in order to avoid a lesser evil, 
namely, the destruction or manipulation of human embryos. According to 
the principle of double effect, even in a moral dilemma the act in question 
must be good or at least neutral. One may not do evil in order to 
accomplish good. The end does not justify the means. 
Besides, even if there is a good intention in adopting and implanting 
human embryos in a genetically foreign womb, a good intention cannot 
make an intrinsically evil act good. Moreover, the long-term consequence 
of either denying the intrinsic evil of "surrogate motherhood" or claiming 
that a good intention can make "surrogate motherhood" morally justifiable 
is that, ironically and tragically, this ultimately plays into the hands of the 
culture of death, which seeks to manipulate human embryos. In other 
words, if "surrogate motherhood" can be morally justifiable in certain 
circumstances, why can't the use of human embryos for medical benefits 
be morally justifiable, especially in the circumstances in which the human 
embryos will otherwise be destroyed? (Even if the latter is not necessarily 
justified by the former, there is the danger, on a societal level, that this is 
precisely how it would be viewed. In other words, the significant 
weakening of respect for human life would be inevitable.) Thus, this is 
why the late Cardinal Basil Hume of England, when faced by a "surplus" 
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of human embryos in his own country, said that the human embryos, rather 
than being destroyed, and rather than being subjected to further 
manipulation and indignity, should be allowed to die, parallel to a person at 
the end of life, for whom further medical treatment would either be useless 
or upon whom further medical treatment would impose a burden that 
would outweigh the goal of that treatment. 
2. The second issue is very much related to the first: the use of 
human embryos for the purpose of attaining stem cells for further 
research and experimentation, hopefully for a number of medical 
benefits. 
The Church's magisterium has clearly taught that the use of human 
embryos for this purpose, and more generally the reduction of human 
embryos as a means to an end, however noble the end may be, is 
intrinsically evil and cannot be morally justified for any reason or set of 
circumstances. In the specific case of the use of human embryos for 
attaining stem cells, the necessity of destroying the embryos is clearly 
morally unacceptable. All the more unacceptable is the creation of human 
embryos for the purpose of manipulating/destroying them. 
However, the further question arises : can it be morally justifiable to 
use existing stem cells lines without any further destruction or 
manipulation of any human embryos? President Bush decided to federally 
fund research on 60 existing stem cell lines, while refusing federal funds 
for any further manipulation/destruction of human embryos. The Holy 
See, in an August 2000 declaration, addressed the question in the following 
way: "The answer is negative, since: prescinding from the participation-
formal or otherwise - in the morally illicit intention of the principle 
agent, the case in question entails a proximate material cooperation in 
the production and manipulation of human embryos on the part of those 
producing or supplying them." 
It is important to understand this notion of proximate material 
cooperation in a way that avoids a narrowed moral vision. One cannot 
apply the principle of cooperation to an issue of far-reaching implications, 
socially and historically, in the same way that one would apply it to the 
behavior of an individual human being. On a societal level, the application 
of this principle requires far greater rigor precisely because, when, on the 
basis of apparently sound moral reasoning, cooperation with evils such as 
the one at issue in this case is viewed as permissible, the evils, by 
becoming institutionalized, take on a life of their own and become part of 
the very fabric of society. Thus, even if one does not either intend to be an 
accomplice in the destruction of human embryos in the past nor want to be 
instrumental in the destruction of human embryos in the future, the use of 
existing stem cell lines, even if not requiling in that use the destruction of 
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human embryos, cannot be morally justified because, despite one's 
intentions, the proximity of the use of the existing stem cell lines to the evil 
of past and future destruction of human embryos "risks" - if it does not 
"necessarily entail" - the institutionalization, within the very fabric of 
society, and therefore within the habits of mind of its members, of "an 
elicited act of the will" by which one wills the destruction of human 
embryos, past or future. 
An elicited act of the will, distinct from commanded acts of the will 
by which we move other parts and powers of ourselves in visible actions, is 
an act of "pure will" within one's own soul that involves no bodily action 
whatsoever, and can be identical with passive acceptance. On its very own, an 
elicited act of the will is a human voluntary act that can be intrinsically good or 
intrinsically evil. Thus, this institutionalization would be, or risk being, 
accomplice not only to the destruction or manipulation of human embryos, 
but also to the dehumanization of members of society through the 
significant weakening of their respect for human life. As Pope John Paul II 
explains in a number of ways in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae, this kind 
of institutionalization is the very stuff of the "culture of death." 
Presumably, these are the reasons why the United States Catholic 
Bishops' Conference president stated: "The federal government, for the 
first time in history, will support research that relies on the destruction of 
some defenseless human beings for the possible benefit to others," 
Fiorenza said in a statement. "It allows our nation 's research enterprise to 
cultivate a disrespect for human life. " 
This kind of institutionalization is not morally justifiable also because 
there are alternatives. Stem cells obtained from postpartum placental tissue 
and from adult bone marrow and tissue, although lacking the pluripotency 
of embryonic and fetal stem cells, are nevertheless scientifically promising 
and do not involve the destruction of human life. Seeking these alternative 
means instead of depending on the destruction and degradation of human 
embryos would not only avoid the issue of cooperation with evil entirely 
but also set a powerful example for other scientists to follow. 
3. The third issue is very similar to the second: is it morally 
justifiable to use vaccines from cell lines derived from aborted fetuses? 
As in the case of the second issue, it is abundantly clear that direct 
abortion for the sake of using fetal tissue or cells for medical benefits 
cannot be morally justified. However, and likewise as in the second issue, 
the question arises: can vaccines derived from aborted fetuses be morally 
justifiably used if the use of the vaccines themselves does not require any 
further abortions? 
Once again, the Church's magisterium has not spoken about this 
specific issue in a definitive manner, although the magisterium has 
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addressed related issues, as I shall indicate further on. In the meantime, let 
us consider the arguments used by those who favor the use of the vaccines. 
The two basic points of these arguments are that 1) these vaccines are the 
only available alternative to the spread of the di sease (hepatitis A, a viral 
infection of the liver); 2) the individual receiving the vaccine is not in 
immoral cooperation with the evil of abortion. 
If you examine the two basic points made by the arguments for the 
moral justification of the use of these vaccines, you will notice that they are 
intimately related. 1) The first point (they are the only alternatives to 
treating the di sease) is essentially a matter of arguing that they are morally 
justifiable because we need them. 2) The second point (the person 
receiving the vaccine does not will the abortion from which it is derived) is 
essentially a matter of arguing that, because the abortion at issue happened 
so long ago and that no further abortions are required for this vaccination, 
receiving the vaccination is morally justifiable. 
The first point is flawed for a number of reasons. First of all, leaving 
it simply at saying that something is morally justifiable because I need it as 
a means to an end, and indeed, a good end (preservation of one's life) is 
absolutely identical with the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies 
the means (or, that evil may be done in order to accomplish good) and, 
thus, absolutely unacceptable and morally indefensible. (A more 
sophisticated argument, based on the principle of double effect, might state 
that the degree of cooperating with the evil of abortion in order to attain the 
needed vaccines is morally justifiable in the face of the greater evil of 
suffering from the diseases that the vaccines would prevent. However, the 
principle of double effect applies only if there are no alternative 
solutions; and this is far from being true in this case.) 
Secondly, precisely because this Machiavellian principle is morally 
indefensible, one needs to examine the very thing needed in this particular 
case - cell lines from aborted fetuses. To say that one needs the cell lines 
of aborted fetuses to preserve one's life is inseparable from saying that one 
needs the abortions - intrinsically evil actions - that make the cell lines 
available. And this is where the point of the first argument meets - and 
betrays - the point of the second argument. 
To say that a person receiving this vaccination - derived from a fetus 
aborted long ago - does not will the abortion that makes the vaccination 
possible may well be true in the individual and isolated case of the person 
who does not know the origin of the vaccine. However, in keeping with 
the discussion in connection with the second issue above, one cannot base 
the moral argumentation for a practice intended for the entire population 
upon the ignorance of this person or upon the correct moral behavior of the 
individual recipient of the vaccine. In fact, the second argument in favor of 
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the moral justification of the use of these vaccines not only very clearly 
presupposes the knowledge of the origin of the vaccine, but also advocates 
that society in general adopt the use of thi s vaccine. With that knowledge 
in place, and with the institutionalization of the vaccine within the very 
fabric of soc iety in place, to say that a person receiving thi s vaccination -
derived from a fetus aborted long ago - does not will the abortion that 
makes the vaccine possible is patently false. If I need the vaccine (and it is 
a need that can be satisfied only by an aborted fetus) and if I defend my 
need, I will the abortion. The person receiving the vaccination may well be 
living long after the fetus was actually aborted, and had no involvement in 
and may even have no knowledge of the particular and actual fetus that 
was aborted. However, the remoteness in time is not sufficient for arguing 
that there is no act of the will on the part of the recipient of the vaccine, 
even if, once again, only an elicited act of the will , institutionalized within 
societal practice and within the habits of minds of its members. 
This immoral elicited act of the will, if for no other reason, is why the 
Holy See, in its "Charter for Health Care Workers," teaches that "the fetus 
cannot be used for experimentation or transplant if the ab0l1ion was caused 
voluntarily. To do so would be an unworthy instrumentalization of a 
human life." Even if the Holy See is referring to the fetus as such and not 
to cell lines from the fetus, the moral principle about elicited acts of the 
will still applies. Beyond the point about this elicited act, there is the 
further problem of the long-term consequences of allowing the use of these 
vaccines. On this issue, and so many like it, we desperately need to see 
more than a few feet in front of us. Thinking that we know what we need 
here and now does not necessarily mean that we do know or, therefore, that 
we should want it. This is why it would be wise in this particular matter to 
abide by the u.S. Bishops ' directive forbidding the use of tissue from 
aborted fetuses, even for therapeutic purposes. Again, even if the bishops 
are referring to tissue of aborted fetuses rather than cell lines from aborted 
fetuses , the moral principle about elicited acts of the will still applies. This 
is also why it would be wise to heed the directive of the Holy See's 1987 
document, Donum Vitae (Gift of Life): "The corpses of human embryos 
and fetuses, whether they have been deliberately aborted or not, must be 
respected just as the remains of other human beings... the moral 
requirement must be safeguarded, that there be no complicity in deliberate 
abol1ion and that the risk of scandal be avoided." 
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